Encryption

Post-quantum encryption for email

Why quantum computers threaten today's email encryption, what harvest now, decrypt later means, and how hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM helps.

Quantum computing sounds like science fiction, and for most everyday tasks it still is. But for cryptography, the arrival of large, reliable quantum computers is a serious and well-understood risk. Email is especially exposed, because messages are often kept for years and can be recorded today for decryption later. This article explains the threat in plain language, describes the new generation of post-quantum algorithms, and shows how Secbird uses a hybrid approach to protect your mail now and in the future.

Why quantum computers matter for encryption

Most of the public-key cryptography in use today relies on mathematical problems that are extremely hard for ordinary computers to solve. Two families dominate:

  • RSA, which relies on the difficulty of factoring very large numbers.
  • Elliptic-curve cryptography, such as X25519 and Ed25519, which relies on the difficulty of the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem.

For classical computers, breaking a well-chosen key of either kind would take an impractically long time. Quantum computers work differently. In the 1990s, the mathematician Peter Shor described an algorithm that a sufficiently large quantum computer could use to solve both problems efficiently. Such a machine would be able to derive private keys from public keys, which would break the encryption and signatures that protect much of the internet.

What quantum computers do not break

The threat is specific. Symmetric ciphers such as AES and hash functions such as SHA-2 and SHA-3 are much more resistant. The best known quantum attack on them, Grover's algorithm, roughly halves their effective strength, which is why modern systems use 256-bit symmetric keys. The real problem is public-key cryptography, which is exactly what email encryption uses to exchange keys.

"Harvest now, decrypt later"

You might reasonably ask why this matters before large quantum computers exist. The answer is a strategy known as harvest now, decrypt later.

An adversary with the resources to do so can record encrypted traffic and store encrypted data today, even though they cannot read it yet. If, years from now, they gain access to a powerful quantum computer, they can go back to that archive and decrypt it.

For many kinds of data this would not matter much. But email is different:

  • Emails often contain information that stays sensitive for a long time: medical details, legal matters, financial records, personal relationships, business plans.
  • Mailboxes are kept for years, sometimes decades.
  • Email travels across many networks and is a natural target for large-scale collection.

If a message needs to stay confidential for ten or twenty years, it needs to be protected against the computers that may exist in ten or twenty years, not only against today's.

A new generation of algorithms

Cryptographers have spent years designing and analysing post-quantum algorithms: public-key schemes based on mathematical problems that are believed to be hard for both classical and quantum computers. After an extensive public selection process, standards bodies have published the first post-quantum standards. The most important for encryption is ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism), which is based on lattice problems.

ML-KEM is a key-encapsulation mechanism. In simple terms, it lets one party create a shared secret that only the holder of a particular private key can recover. That shared secret can then be used, just like a session key, to encrypt the actual message with a symmetric cipher.

Why not simply switch to ML-KEM?

Post-quantum algorithms are newer than the classical algorithms they replace. They have been studied intensively, but they have not had decades of real-world use. History offers reasons for caution: some candidates in the selection process were broken by classical attacks late in the evaluation. Moving entirely to a new algorithm overnight would trade one risk for another.

The hybrid approach

The answer adopted by careful security engineers is to combine the two worlds. In a hybrid scheme, a message key is protected by both a classical algorithm and a post-quantum algorithm at the same time, and an attacker must break both to recover it.

Secbird uses X25519 combined with ML-KEM:

  1. When a message is encrypted to you, your sender's app performs an X25519 key agreement with your classical public key.
  2. It also performs an ML-KEM encapsulation with your post-quantum public key.
  3. The two resulting secrets are combined through a key-derivation function into a single key.
  4. That combined key protects the session key that encrypts the message.

The security reasoning is straightforward:

  • If ML-KEM turns out to have an unexpected weakness, X25519 still protects the message against classical attackers, exactly as it does today.
  • If a large quantum computer breaks X25519, ML-KEM still protects the message.
Attacker capabilityClassical only (X25519)Post-quantum only (ML-KEM)Hybrid (X25519 + ML-KEM)
Classical computerProtectedProtected, if ML-KEM holds upProtected
Future quantum computerNot protectedProtectedProtected
Unexpected flaw in ML-KEMProtectedNot protectedProtected

What this means for you

Hybrid post-quantum encryption is enabled automatically for every Secbird account. When you create an account, your device generates both classical and post-quantum keys. There is nothing to configure and no change to how you write or read email.

Messages between Secbird users

Messages between Secbird users use the hybrid scheme end-to-end. Both sender and recipient have post-quantum keys, so the protection applies from the moment you press send.

Your stored mailbox

Zero-access encryption of incoming mail also uses your hybrid keys, so messages that arrive from other providers are stored under post-quantum protection as soon as they reach Secbird. You can read more about this in our article on zero-access encryption.

Messages to other OpenPGP users

When you write to someone who uses another OpenPGP tool, your app uses the strongest keys that the recipient has published. If their software supports post-quantum keys, the hybrid scheme is used. If not, the message is protected with classical encryption, which remains secure against today's computers.

Signatures and authentication

Encryption is the most urgent part of the post-quantum transition because of harvest now, decrypt later. Signatures are different: a signature only needs to be unforgeable at the time it is checked. Even so, the industry is moving towards post-quantum signature schemes, and Secbird's key format is designed so that signature algorithms can be upgraded as standards mature, without disrupting your account.

Authentication to your account works independently of message encryption. Secbird uses SRP so your password never reaches our servers, and you can add a passkey or hardware security key for strong two-factor authentication. Our article on passkeys and hardware security keys explains how these work.

Common questions

Do large quantum computers exist today?

Not at a scale that can break modern public-key cryptography. Estimates of when they might arrive vary widely. The point of post-quantum encryption is not to predict the date, but to make sure that data recorded today stays safe whenever that date comes.

Does post-quantum encryption make email slower?

Not noticeably. ML-KEM keys and ciphertexts are larger than classical ones, which adds a small amount of data to each message, but the computation is fast on modern phones and computers.

Do I need to do anything to my existing messages?

Messages protected with Secbird's hybrid keys are already covered. If you import mail from another provider, it is encrypted with your keys as it is imported.

Is AES still safe?

Yes. Secbird uses 256-bit symmetric encryption for message content, which keeps a comfortable security margin even against quantum attacks.

A short history of cryptographic transitions

Post-quantum migration is not the first time the security world has had to replace algorithms that were once considered safe. Looking back helps explain why a careful, hybrid approach makes sense.

From short keys to long keys

In the early days of public-key cryptography, RSA keys of 512 bits were common. As computers became faster and factoring techniques improved, those keys became breakable, and the recommended minimum rose to 1024 bits and then to 2048 bits and beyond. Each step took years to roll out across software, servers and devices.

From broken hash functions to stronger ones

Hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1 were once standard. Researchers gradually found weaknesses, first theoretical and then practical. The industry moved to SHA-2 and SHA-3, but old algorithms lingered in some systems long after they were known to be unsafe.

Lessons for the quantum transition

These transitions teach three lessons. First, change takes far longer than expected, so starting early matters. Second, algorithms that look solid can turn out to have weaknesses, so defence in depth is wise. Third, the systems that move first are the ones built with upgrades in mind. Secbird's key format and protocols are designed so that algorithms can be updated over time without forcing you to create a new account or lose access to old messages.

What to look for in a provider

If you are evaluating email providers with long-term confidentiality in mind, ask these questions:

  • Does the provider use post-quantum or hybrid encryption for message keys today, or only talk about plans?
  • Is post-quantum protection applied to stored mail as well as to messages in transit?
  • Are the algorithms standardised and publicly specified, rather than proprietary?
  • Is the classical algorithm kept alongside the post-quantum one, so that a flaw in either does not expose your mail?
  • Can the system upgrade algorithms in the future without breaking access to existing messages?

At Secbird, hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM protects both messages between users and the mail stored in your mailbox, using standardised algorithms, with room to evolve as the field matures.

Preparing for the future, today

Cryptographic transitions take years. The move away from older hash functions and short RSA keys took the better part of two decades. The time to protect long-lived data against future threats is before those threats arrive. With hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM, Secbird gives you the proven security of classical cryptography and the forward-looking protection of post-quantum algorithms, in every account, at no extra cost.

To see how post-quantum encryption fits with the rest of Secbird's design, visit our Security page, or create a free account to start using it right away.

Further reading

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